Monthly Archives: April 2019

Welcome Michel Reece

Posted on by
Reply

Michel.ReeceThe THaW team is pleased to welcome Prof. Michel Reece, of Morgan State University, as a new collaborator in research on security and privacy issues medical devices.  Together with Tim Pierson (Dartmouth) and David Kotz (Dartmouth), Michel and her group will investigate the potential for identifying devices through features sensed at the PHY and MAC layers, and validating the authenticity of such devices.

Dr. Michel A. Reece currently serves as the interim Chairperson and  the director of  the laboratory for Advanced RF/Microwave Measurement and Electronic Design (ARMMED) in the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering at Morgan State University (MSU). Her research interests include wireless  signal characterization and device authentication of IoT devices, high frequency device characterization and modeling for III-V semiconductors, RF/ MMIC circuit design, adaptable electronic components for software defined radio applications and most recently power amplifier development for THz mobile communication applications. She received her B.S from Morgan State in 1995 and her M.S.E.E.  from Penn State in 1997, both in Electrical Engineering. She became the first female recipient at MSU  to obtain her doctorate degree in Engineering in 2003.  Previously, she served as a post- doctoral researcher of the Microwave Systems Section of the RF Engineering Group at Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory Space Department. She has a passion for education where she has developed curriculum for the RF Microwave Engineering concentration offered at MSU, one out of a few HBCUs to have a dedicated program in this area. She has also taught as an adjunct faculty member at Johns Hopkins University Engineering Professionals Program.

Cybersecurity vulnerabilities

Posted on by
Reply

David Slotwiner, Thomas Deering, Kevin Fu, Andrea Russo, Mary Walsh, and George Van Hare recently published a paper titled Cybersecurity vulnerabilities of cardiac implantable electronic devices: Communication strategies for clinicians:

Abstract: Computers, networking, and software have become essential tools for health care. Our daily lives increasingly depend on digital technology, and we are persistently bombarded by the need to secure the systems and data they generate and store from attack, damage, and unauthorized access. Cybersecurity vulnerabilities of cardiac implantable electronic devices (CIEDs) are no longer hypothetical. While no incident of a cybersecurity breach of a CIED implanted in a patient has been reported, and no patient is known to have been harmed to date by the exploitation of a vulnerability, the potential for such a scenario does exist. The public awareness of cybersecurity vulnerabilities in medical devices, particularly devices such as CIEDs on which a patient’s life may depend and where the potential for reprogramming or rendering the device nonfunctional exists, is raising questions and fueling fears among patients and the clinical provider community. The Heart Rhythm Society (HRS) has identified a gap in clinician-patient communication about the appropriate balance of the risks of such a potential attack against the benefits of lifesaving medical devices. To address these communication gaps, HRS convened a 1-day summit in November 2017, in partnership with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The goal of the meeting was to develop patient-centered communication strategies for health care professionals, industry, and governmental agencies. Participants included patient representatives, subject matter experts, HRS and the American College of Cardiology leadership, representatives from the FDA, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FB1) and leadership of 5 CIED manufacturers. This proceedings statement is based on the 4 communication themes that emerged from the discussion: when to notify patients, whom to notify, how to communicate with patients, and key elements to discuss with patients.

Proceedings of the Heart Rhythm Society’s Leadership Summit, Heart Rhythm Journal, July 2018.  DOI 10.1016/j.hrthm.2018.05.001.

Tattle Tail Security

Posted on by
Reply

Lanier Watkins, Shreya Aggarwal, Omotola Akeredolu, William H. Robinson and Aviel D. Rubin recently published a paper titled Tattle Tail Security: An Intrusion Detection System for Medical Body Area Networks:

Abstract:  Medical Body Area Networks (MBAN) are created when Wireless Sensor Nodes (WSN) are either embedded into the patient’s body or strapped onto it. MBANs are used to monitor the health of patients in real-time in their homes. Many cyber protection mechanisms exist for the infrastructure that interfaces with MBANs; however, not many effective cyber security mechanisms exist for MBANs. We introduce a low-overhead security mechanism for MBANs based on having nodes infer anomalous power dissipation in their neighbors to detect compromised nodes. Nodes will infer anomalous power dissipation in their neighbors by detecting a change in their packet send rate. After two consecutive violations, the node will “Tattle” on its neighbor to the gateway, which will alert the Telemedicine administrator and notify all other nodes to ignore the compromised node.

Workshop on Decentralized IoT Systems and Security (DISS ’19),  (February, 2019). (pdf)

Intrusion Detection for Medical Body Area Networks (MBAN)

Posted on by
Reply

THaW researchers recently presented a new paper at the Workshop on Decentralized IoT Systems and Security (DISS).  [PDF]

Abstract:  Medical Body Area Networks (MBAN) are created when Wireless Sensor Nodes (WSN) are either embedded into the patient’s body or strapped onto it. MBANs are used to monitor the health of patients in real-time in their homes. Many cyber protection mechanisms exist for the infrastructure that interfaces with MBANs; however, not many effective cyber security mechanisms exist for MBANs. We introduce a low-overhead security mechanism for MBANs based on having nodes infer anomalous power dissipation in their neighbors to detect compromised nodes. Nodes will infer anomalous power dissipation in their neighbors by detecting a change in their packet send rate. After two consecutive violations, the node will “Tattle” on its neighbor to the gateway, which will alert the Telemedicine administrator and notify all other nodes to ignore the compromised node.

TattleTale-DISS19 figure1

Proposed Telemedicine Scenario